A proposition
Suppose I have a choice at time T between two alternatives, A and not A (I can eat a slice of pizza or not eat it). We cannot conclude, from a consideration of the event at some time after time T, that what I actually chose is what God's will was before time T for me.
posted by Whiskey at 12:41 PM
16 Comments:
We cannot conclude, from a consideration of the event at some time after time T, that what I actually chose is what God's will was before time T for me.
I don't understand what you mean by "God's will before time T." God's will is not temporal. It cannot change from one time to another. Nor can any event happen outside of God's will. So I fail to see how we could conclude anything but.
I must apologize for writing such a short post, simply to tantalize you and prompt this reaction. I know that I really should have just stated my full position all at once, but I was working and just wanted to get something out there quick.
When speaking of the relation of creatures to God, it is appropriate to use words which designate temporally, not because we thereby signify some chance in God, but rather because we signify a change in our relation to God (Ia13a7c). So it is meaningful to talk about God's will at a certain time, not because we thereby signify that God's will changes, but that we signify our changing relation to it.
The obvious case in which my claim is true is with sin. God in no way is a cause of sin; therefore it cannot be his will that I sin at time T (eat the pizza slice off the plate of a stranger with no intention of paying him for it). This is an interesting converse of my claim: we can claim definitively at some time after time T in certain circumstances if my action was expressly not God's will.
But I think my first claim is true in all circumstances. Suppose that neither A nor not A were sins; nevertheless it follows that one is the better action (surely you agree with me here!). But that fact cannot help us in determining God's will -- I see no contradiction in God causing a lesser good. Just as God can permit sin, God can permit me to choose the lesser of two real goods (for example, if I get married when my vocation is really to be a priest). But this does not mean that this is what God wants me to do in the strictest sense.
Now, I admit that what will happen in the future is certain; for example, Aquinas argues that those who are predestined are certain to achieve blessedness (Ia23a6). But Aquinas says in the same article that their salvation is not necessary. Thus, there can be things which are certain and not necessary. They are certain considered from the perspective of divine foreknowledge, but they are not necessary from the perspective of human nature.
Thus, I admit that before time T we know that God knows what I will choose. But it does not follow that such was God's will.
This is what I take to be the significance of talk of harmonizing our wills with God's. Our wills need to be harmonized with God's because they are not that way now; in other words, we do not act the way God would have us act. This is true even when we aren't sinning, I think.
The broadest point is that since God's will is infinite, we can know nothing of it except insofar as we can know Him through His effects. But in the realm of human action, what we know is that we are free. Therefore, it does not follow from the fact of my having chosen a certain way that God's will was that I chose that way.
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The obvious case in which my claim is true is with sin. God in no way is a cause of sin; therefore it cannot be his will that I sin at time T (eat the pizza slice off the plate of a stranger with no intention of paying him for it). This is an interesting converse of my claim: we can claim definitively at some time after time T in certain circumstances if my action was expressly not God's will.
Per our discussion on my blog, it is a [pious] imprecision to say that God is in no way the cause of sin, designed to avoid the appearance of imputing blame to God (which objection can be answered without having recourse to the pious imprecision, but that's a topic for another post). He does not will the sin of theft per se, but he wills it per accidens, inasmuch as he wills a being, namely the physical action of swiping the pizza, and another being, namely the circumstances that make it theft, that you're sitting next to a stranger who hasn't offered you his pizza, etc; which action, in these circumstances, cannot be anything other than theft. Put most simply, God wills an action, which happens to be theft, although he does not will precisely as theft. This is the very meaning of per accidens; just as a builder, who is the per se cause of the house, is the per accidens cause of the musician's house, since he does not cause it as a musician's house, but just as a house. Thus, to speak very precisely, if we say that your action was expressly not God's will, this should be qualified to your action inasmuch as it is sinful.
But I think my first claim is true in all circumstances. Suppose that neither A nor not A were sins; nevertheless it follows that one is the better action (surely you agree with me here!). But that fact cannot help us in determining God's will -- I see no contradiction in God causing a lesser good.
This is easily solved by distinguishing between God's antecedent will, which is what he would will with respect to things taken in themselves apart from circumstances, and his positive will, which is what he wills for things taking everything into account, that is to say, what he actually wills. Antecedently, God would presumably will whichever of the two is better. Positively, i.e. actually, God wills whichever one you do do. God's positive will therefore includes many lesser goods. I don't think it's necessary to argue about which sense of willing is the "strictest" sense. Also, I am not saying we can determine God's positive will ahead of time, only after the fact.
Aquinas argues that those who are predestined are certain to achieve blessedness (Ia23a6). But Aquinas says in the same article that their salvation is not necessary. Thus, there can be things which are certain and not necessary.
Indeed. Given that God wills that the predestined achieve blessedness, they are certain to do so. But since he wills that they do so contingently, it is not necessary, but rather it is certain to happen contingently.
Thus, I admit that before time T we know that God knows what I will choose. But it does not follow that such was God's will.
The reason God knows what will happen in the future, is because he is its cause. Otherwise our wills would be determinative of his knowledge, which is impossible.
In other words, we do not act the way God would have us act. This is true even when we aren't sinning, I think.
Do you then deny that God's will is always fulfilled? This might be true of his antecedent will, but certainly not of his positive will.
But in the realm of human action, what we know is that we are free. Therefore, it does not follow from the fact of my having chosen a certain way that God's will was that I chose that way.
It does indeed, inasmuch as your choice is, since we can only choose freely because God moves us to choose freely. Thus it is said, it is God who works in us both to will and to work (Phil. 2:13).
Put most simply, God wills an action, which happens to be theft, although he does not will precisely as theft.
He would will it as what then? If this can't be answered then the statement below doesn't mean anything really:
Thus, to speak very precisely, if we say that your action was expressly not God's will, this should be qualified to your action inasmuch as it is sinful.
Secondly;
This is easily solved by distinguishing between God's antecedent will, which is what he would will with respect to things taken in themselves apart from circumstances, and his positive will, which is what he wills for things taking everything into account, that is to say, what he actually wills.
How can one will something apart from circumstances? It seem to me that will by its definition is acting within circumstances. If that is the case them "God's positive will" is a vacuous term.
Lastly, the dillemma is, in essence, a discussion about cause and effect, both regarding God and man and how they can both act freely. The assumption behind the discussion is that the effects from God are the same sort of effects from man.? God created, ex nihilo, man cannot not. Consequently, the way God affects the world in His action ought to be construed as radically different than the way man does. This view bears further unfolding but it seems to me a better method for beginning to articulate the (at the least) seeming antinomy.
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After rereading my comment, I noticed it came off more flip than I intended. Sapientiae amator, I beg you to forgive me polemical tone.
1) Of course it can be answered. The action of every sin God wills in its natural species, not as a moral act, which latter arises from free judgment: "The deformity of sin does not follow the species of the act insofar as it is in a genus of nature; thus however it is caused by God; but it follows the species of the act insofar as it is moral, as it is caused by free judgment" (De Malo, Q.3 A.2 Reply 2). In the natural species of any act, including those that are called intrinsically wrong, is not essentially sinful, but is wrong insofar as it is joined to an unreasonable will (the reason some actions are called intrinsically evil is because there is never a set of circumstances under which they can be reasonably willed). Thus, since the moral aspect is joined not essentially but accidentally to the natural species, it is not necessary to say that it is intended by God when he wills the natural species. For example, because meeting a certain person on the way to the store is not essential but accidental to the act of going to the store, it does not follow that when I intend to go to the store I intend to meet that person, even if I know with absolute certainty that I will meet that person on the way. This would be clear if it were someone I didn't want to meet, but decided to put up with it because I really wanted to go to the store. Similarly, God does not intend evil but puts up with it, for which reason he is said to permit evil rather than to cause it (although, again, this latter can be understood in a perfectly legitimate sense).
2) Exactly. Because one doesn't really will something apart from circumstances, God's positive will, which includes circumstances, is also called his "simple will," i.e. what he actually wills, what he is said to will without qualification. His antecedent will can be thought of more as a rational thing, i.e. his opinion of X vs. Y in the abstract; just as I might say that a religious vocation is better in the abstract than marriage, but for a given person in given circumstances, I might say marriage is better.
3) I agree. In fact, I believe that views such as Whiskey's arise from a subconscious treatment of God as though he were a human being.
4) I suspect everything I write sounds polemical, so I can hardly take offense. :-)
Whiskey's treatment as God as a human being is not entirely unjust, however. But before you leap, here me out.
God is a person. In fact, everything we know about God through Scripture speaks to who God is, not What is God because God is first and foremost a person. So, I want to affirm Whiskey's treatment because, robed in the language of a Thomist is somebody Who sees God as an immenant person. I think some Thomists miss this (I do not know about you).
Secondly, I was thinking about this more during class today. If you say: "He does not will the sin of theft per se, but he wills it per accidens...," then are you not saying that God causes evil per accidens? But an accidental cause is no cause at all. If so, then qualifying the statement in this way does not do justice to the difficulty.
I admit that I was thinking unclearly about God's will in this post, not distinguishing between God's antecedent will and His consequent will. Let's think very carefully about this, however. God can in no way be the cause of moral evil. For God to cause moral evil is a contradiction, in as much as it would imply that God wills that his will be disobeyed. For God to cause sin is therefore absurd.
In the article SA cites from De Malo, Aquinas argues that, while God is not the cause of sin, God is the cause of sinful acts. This is because God is the cause of all being, so since all actions are beings, God must be the cause of them. Sin, in its proper understanding is a deformity of being, not a being, and thus God, in causing the action of sin, causes it insofar as it is a being, but not insofar as it is deformed.
In the example, I steal a piece of pizza. God, as first moving cause, moves my will to Him. But my will is deformed through sin, so I receive that movement from God in a deformed way, and thus perform a deformed action. God is in no way a cause of my deformity, but he is a cause of my action, but not insofar as it is deformed. Thus, God wills the 'natural species' of the action -- eating, I guess -- but not the 'moral species' -- eating what doesn't belong to me.
God would be a per accidens cause of the deformity of sin, if His consequent will was the whole action, considered not simply in its natural species but as this particular action of this particular man in these particular circumstances. But Aquinas is denying that. He is saying that God is not the cause that way, but that His causality extends to the natural species of the act, not to its moral species, which considers the act as performed by me in these circumstances. Therefore, God is not the per accidens cause of the sin.
In the replies to the objections of the same article, Aquinas makes this point this way. He compares sin to the deformity in a dog's leg and God to the motive power of the dog's soul. Aquinas says, we do not attribute the limp of the dog to the motive power, but simply to the defect in the leg. In a similar way, we do not attribute sin to God, but to the defect of the will. But this would not be the case if the motive power of the dog's soul directed the dog in fact to limp. Similarly, if the whole action, considered as "limping" is attributed to God as it's cause, then God would be the per accidens cause of the sin, insofar as it was necessary for the "limp."
Therefore, although God's consequent will in the hypothetical situation is A, supposing A to be a sin, it is not A as such, but only considered in it's natural species, but in no way in it's moral species.
So then it is not a pious imprecision to say God does not cause sin. All you are really saying is that God causes being.
It seems to me Thomas, if your articulation is correct (I am at work and cannot look at the article itself), is arguing that God is, in fact, not the cause of sin because he is simply a cause of the sinning will per accidens. A accidentally cause is no cause at all. Therefore, etc.
Right?
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Further, God does not will us to do good but desires us to do good. For, if he willed us to do good, then we would not have will ourselves. And, if He does will us to do good and we do evil, then man can confound God's will.
Therefore, etc.
Overlyconscious: Aquinas argues that God is the first mover absolutely, not in a limited realm but of all things, including therefore our own actions. This is because nothing can exist apart from God, who is the source of all being; thus we have to say, I think, that God causes us to will. But Aquinas does not mean by this that therefore our wills are unreal or meaningless. God causes each thing in the manner of its existence; thus, he causes our wills to be free and therefore to be open, not simply in a nominal way but really, to different effects. I think, therefore, we don't need to say that God, in willing that we act in some way, impinges upon our freedom, since God, as infinite cause, can even make contingent things which are really contingent. I'm not sure how to think about sin. Aquinas says that something which escapes God's will on one level, such as sin, is brought back up into God's will on another, such as justice or redemption. I haven't been able to think this through, however, to see how it is true and if it isn't simply avoiding the question.
Do you think any of this is true?
OC: Aquinas agrees with you that something which is a not per se caused by a caused cause is in no way caused by the first cause. But since in sin we do not will evil per se but only insofar as we will a good which is evil, not in itself but in its ordination amongst other goods. Therefore, God, being the cause of our will, does not cause those things which are not per se caused by our will. So I think you are saying the same thing that I am saying, though I'm not sure.
Thanks for the explication of Thomas, it has been a long time since I have read any...I could use a review.
As to whether I believe the view propounded, I am uncertain, particularly because the ariticulation is not biblical (whether it is un-biblical is another question).
I do want to affirm:
1. God's sovereignty
2. Man's Freedom.
3. God is not the origin of sin
First, I agree that insofar as He gives us being, and, consequently, our wills being, He wills our wills but this is not to say that He wills what we will. He certainly desires that we do His Will but does he cause it? There is no doubt that we can only do his will through the guidance of the Holy Spirit; but, then, real question is how does He guide?
Second, there is no doubt that the Lord brings good out of evil, Christ death and ressurection being the chief example.
The more I think about it, the more I think we are saying the same thing. I suppose my beef is more with the claim that "God does not will evil" is a pious imprecision. I guess all I am saying is that the qualifications only clarify your problem more. It manifests that God does not will us to sin per se and, thus, that we sin of our own accord. Yay. But I it doesn't account for why sin is in the world which is really why any man asks the question as far as I can tell.
As a secondary point, when "Sapientiae Amator" claims "God's will is not temporal. It cannot change from one time to another," I get nervous. Frankly, if we are to take the biblical narrative seriously, then in the book of Jonah (to name one of many instances) God sends Jonah to the Ninevites to call them to repentance. He is planning to smite them for there wickedness, yet they repent and God relents (see Jon 4:2), or the striking statements in Hosea 11:8,9. Now we can toss these aside by calling them "anthropomorphims" but this is to assume a Grecian understanding of Who God is and, in turn, use that as a hermeneutic to intrepret Scripture rather than taking it at face value, namely revelation of Who He is (should not this be the Norming Norm). This makes me nervous and, I think, throws a wrench in the cogs. While I do not have an answer for this, I feel like when we get caught up in these distinctions we miss the biblical narrative and the personal God we worship. Things just are as simple as we would like to make them I think.
All told, I do not want to affirm that God is bumbling along trying to figure out what man is doing and constantly re-adjusting His plans. That does not fit biblical narrative either.
I'm going to be busy all day tomorrow, and traveling Friday, so we can all take a couple days to cool off before continuing with this discussion. I think that would probably be wise. You both have made some points worth addressing since my last post.
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