Free Choice and Free Will

Current thoughts on the will: Liberum arbitrium, free choice, is different from voluntas, will, not as two powers are distinguished, but as means are distinguished from ends. The will inclines towards the good to the degree that the good is apprehended by the intellect as an end -- this is the proper operation of the will. Free choice, however, concerns the means to that end, the good. And since the means to that end are indeterminate by their very nature, the will cannot be determined to any one of them of necessity. Thus the notion "freedom of choice" indicates the absence of absolute antecedent determination with respect to the means available regarding a given end. "Free will," on the other hand, indicates the power to pursue the unpossessed good and to rest in the possessed good. "Free will" indicates the autonomy of the self in the realm of agent cause. "Free choice" indicates the lack of formal determination (should I set my alarm for 6 am or 6:30?), which, while it must be grounded in the autonomy of the will, is nevertheless distinct from it in notion. I think.